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Abstract
The enduring replication crisis in many scientific disciplines casts doubt on the
ability of science to self-correct and to produce reliable knowledge. There are dif-
ferent approaches for addressing this challenge. Social reformists hypothesize that
the social structure of science such as the credit reward scheme must be changed.
Methodological reformists suggest changes to the way data are gathered, ana-
lyzed and shared, such as compulsory pre-registration or multi-site experiments
with different research teams. Statistical reformists argue more specifically that
science would be more reliable and self-corrective if null hypothesis significance
tests (NHST) were replaced by a different inference framework, such as Bayesian
statistics. On the basis of a simulation study for meta-analytic aggregation of ef-
fect sizes, we articulate a middle ground between the different reform proposals:
statistical reform alone won’t suffice, but moving to Bayesian statistics eliminates
important sources of overestimating effect sizes.
1 Introduction
In recent years, several scientific disciplines have been facing a replication crisis: re-
searchers fail to reproduce the results of previous experiments when copying the orig-
inal experimental design. By investigating replication rates for a representative sample
of published papers, and more specifically the main effect a paper reports, scientists
have tried to assess the seriousness of the crisis in a systematic way. The outcome of
these studies is sobering: the rate of statistically significant findings drops dramati-
cally and the observed effect sizes are often much lower (for the fields of psychology,
experimental economics and cancer biology, respectively: Open Science Collaboration
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2015; Camerer et al. 2016; Nosek and Errington 2017). While the appropriate inter-
pretation of replication failures is debatable (e.g., Gilbert et al. 2016), there is a shared
sentiment that science is not as reliable as it is supposed to be and that something
needs to change.
There is a wide range of possible reforms addressing the crisis. Some researchers
identify as the main causes of low replicability the adverse effects of social and struc-
tural factors (Bakker, van Dijk, and Wicherts 2012; Nuijten et al. 2016; Romero 2017)
and questionable research practices (“QRPs”: Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn 2011).
This assessment suggests to adopt social reforms, such as educating researchers about
statistical cognition and methodology (Schmidt 1996; Lakens, Scheel, and Isager 2018)
and creating greater incentives for replication work, for example by publishing and
co-citing replications alongside original studies (Koole and Lakens 2012) or by estab-
lishing a separate career track for confirmatory research (Romero 2018). Other authors
suggest methodological reforms: pre-registering studies and stating the data analysis
plan prior to the actual experiment (Quintana 2015), sharing experimental data for
“successful” as well as “failed” studies (Assen et al. 2014; Munafò et al. 2017) and
promoting multi-site experiments as an antidote to various forms of bias (Klein et al.
2014). On the purely statistical end, numerous authors identify “classical” statisti-
cal inference based on Null Hypothesis Significance Tests (NHST) as the main culprit
(Rosenthal 1979; Cohen 1994; Goodman 1999a,a; Ioannidis 2005; Ziliak and McCloskey
2008), which strongly suggests to adopt statistical reforms. These include moving to-
ward Bayesian inference (Goodman 1999b; Rouder et al. 2009; Lee and Wagenmakers
2014), likelihood-based inference (Royall 1997), inference based on effect sizes confi-
dence intervals (Fidler 2005; Cumming 2012, 2014) and even purely descriptive data
summaries (Trafimow and Marks 2015).
Most likely all these reform proposals have some merit, but statistical reforms in
particular are often regarded as necessary interventions that would improve science
even if social and other methodological aspects of science remained the same. Hence,
in this paper we evaluate the case for statistical reform conducting a systematic com-
puter simulation study. The study is framed with respect to a prominent philosophi-
cal thesis: the self-corrective nature of science (e.g., Peirce 1931–1935; Mayo 1996). A
strong version of the self-corrective thesis (SCT) asserts that scientific method guar-
antees convergence to true theories in the long run (Laudan 1981): by staying on the
path of scientific method, errors in published research will eventually be discovered,
corrected and wed out. In the context of statistical inference and the replication crisis,
we consider a more precise and testable version of SCT: sequential replications of an
experiment will eventually “reveal the truth” (Romero 2016).
SCT* Given a series of direct replications of an experiment, the meta-analytical aggre-
gation of their effect sizes will converge on the true effect size as the length of
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the series of replications increases.
Arguably, validating SCT* in the precisely defined context of direct replications (i.e.,
experiments that copy the original design) would be a minimal condition for any of
the more far-reaching claims that science eventually corrects error and converges to
the truth. Conversely, if SCT* fails—and the replication crisis provides some prelim-
inary evidence that we should not take SCT* for granted—then claims to the general
truth of SCT, and to science as a reliable source of knowledge, are highly implausible.
Given our focus on statistical reform, we ask specifically: Does replacing NHST with
Bayesian statistics make science more self-corrective? Or are such claims sensitive to
the conventions and biases that affect experimental design and data reporting? Taking
these contextual factors into account, the results of our study suggest that statistical
reform alone will not suffice. However, in many conditions that are typical of scientific
practice, switching from NHST to Bayesian inference reduces overestimation of effect
size substantially and makes experimental research more reliable.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly explains the two competing
statistical paradigms—frequentist inference with NHST and Bayesian inference. Sec-
tion 3 describes the simulation model and the (statistical and social) factors it includes.
Sections 4–6 present the results of multiple simulation scenarios that allow us to eval-
uate and contrast NHST and Bayesian inference in a variety of practically important
circumstances. Finally, Section 7 discusses the philosophical implications of the study
and suggests projects for further research.
2 NHST and Bayesian Inference
Suppose we would like to measure the efficacy of an experimental intervention—
for example, whether on-site classes lead to higher student performance than remote
teaching. In frequentist statistics, the predominant technique for addressing such a
question is Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST). At the basis stands a de-
fault or null hypothesis H0 about an unknown parameter of interest. Typically, it
makes a precise statement about this parameter (e.g., µ = 0), or it claims that the pa-
rameter has the same value in two different experimental groups (e.g., µ1 = µ2). For
example, the null hypothesis may claim that classroom and remote teaching do not
differ in their effect on student grades. Opposed to the null hypothesis is the alterna-
tive hypothesis H1 which corresponds, in most practical applications, to the negation
of the null hypothesis (e.g., µ 6= 0 or µ1 6= µ2). When we test such hypotheses against
each other, we obtain a so-called two-sided hypothesis test: an experimental design
where strong deviations in either direction from the “null value” count as evidence
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against the null hypothesis, and in favor of the alternative.1
If we assume that the data in both experimental conditions (e.g., student grades for
on-site and remote teaching) are Normally distributed with unknown variance, it is
common to analyze them by a t-statistic, that is, a standardized difference between the
sample mean in both groups. This statistic measures the divergence of the data from
the null hypothesis H0 : µ1 = µ2. If the value of t indicates a strong divergence from
zero—and more precisely, if it falls into the most extreme 5% of the distribution—,
we reject the null hypothesis and call the result “statistically significant” at the 5% level
(p < .05). In the above example, such a result means evidence for the alternative
hypothesis that classroom and remote teaching differ in their effect on student grades.
Otherwise we state a “non-significant result” or a “non-effect” (p > .05). Similarly, a
result in the 1%-tail of the distribution of the t-statistic is called “highly significant”
(p < .01). 2
The contrast model is Bayesian inference, where probabilities express subjective
degrees of belief in a scientific hypothesis (Bernardo and Smith 1994; Howson and
Urbach 2006). p(H) quantifies your prior degree of belief in hypothesis H whereas
p(H|D), the conditional probability of H given D, quantifies your posterior degree of
belief in H—that is, the degree of belief in H after learning data D. While the posterior
probability p(H|D) serves as a basis for inference and decision-making, the evidential
import of a dataset D on two competing hypotheses is standardly described by the
Bayes factor
BF10(D) :=
p(H1|D) / p(H0|D)
p(H1) / p(H0)
=
p(D|H1)
p(D|H0) .
The Bayes factor is defined as the ratio between posterior and prior odds of H1 over
H0 (Kass and Raftery 1995). Equivalently, it can be interpreted as the likelihood ratio
of H1 and H0 with respect to data D—that is, as a measure of how much the evidence
discriminates between the two hypotheses, and which hypothesis explains the data
better. Bayes factors BF10 > 1 favor the alternative hypothesis H1, and Bayes factors
in the range 0 < BF10 < 1 favor the null hypothesis H0. Finally, note that the Bayes
factors for the null and the alternative are each other’s inverse: BF01 = 1/BF10.
1One-sided, that is, directional, tests also exist, but they are used much less frequently than two-sided
tests. For a discussion, see Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, and van der Maas (2011).
2The implicit logic of NHST—to “reject” the null hypothesis and to declare a result statistically signifi-
cant evidence if it deviates strongly from the null value—has been criticized for a long time in philosophy,
statistics and beyond (e.g., Edwards, Lindman, and Savage 1963; Hacking 1965; Spielman 1974). In this
paper, we shall not enter into this foundational debate (for pros and cons, see for example Romeijn 2014;
Sprenger 2016; Mayo 2018; van Dongen et al. forthcoming).
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3 Model Description and Simulation Design
The design of our simulation model follows Romero 2016, with the crucial difference
that the choice of the statistical framework (i.e., Bayesian vs. frequentist/NHST infer-
ence) is added as an exogenous variable. The focus of the research question is differ-
ent, too: While Romero’s 2016 paper analyzes whether SCT* still holds when relaxing
ideal, utopian conditions for scientific inquiry, our paper studies how the validity of
SCT* is affected by choosing a statistical framework.
To examine the self-corrective abilities of Bayesian and frequentist inference, we
first need a measure of effect size. They come in different categories: measures of cor-
relation for paired data (e.g., Pearson’s r), measures of statistical association between
categorical variables (e.g., risk difference or risk ratio in medicine), or standardized
measures of how a sample means differs across two experimental conditions. Since the
latter measures are most common in the behavioral sciences—arguably the disciplines
hit most by the replication crisis—, we adopt them in our model, too. Specifically, we
study the aggregation of observed effect sizes from experiments with two independent
samples and Normally distributed data with unknown population means. There is a
wide range of statistical techniques for studying such data and the effect size can be
adequately summarized by Cohen’s d:
Cohen’s d If X1 and X2 denote the observed sample means in two experimental con-
ditions, then Cohen’s d is equal to their standardized difference:
d =
X1 − X2
SP
where SP denotes the pooled standard deviation of the data.3
Conventionally, a d around 0.2 is considered small, around 0.5 is considered medium,
and around 0.8 is considered large. For both Bayesians and frequentists, the natural
null hypothesis is H0 : d = 0, stating equal means in both groups. Frequentists leave
the alternative hypothesis H1 : d 6= 0 unspecified whereas Bayesians put a diffuse
prior over the various values of d, typically a Cauchy distribution such as H1 : d ∼
Cauchy(0, 1/
√
2) (Rouder et al. 2009).4
3SP is defined as SP =
√
(N1−1)S21+(N2−1)S22
N1+N2−2 where N1 and N2 are the sample sizes for both conditions,
and S21 and S
2
2 denote the corrected within-sample variance.
4Here, we abuse notation by using d simultaneously as denoting a measure of observed effect size and,
in the specification of H0 and H1, as an unknown parameter. That parameter is in reality a function of the
unknown group means µ1 and µ2 and the unknown variance σ2. (Recall that X ∼ N(µ1,2, σ2).) Speaking
strictly, we should therefore write H0 : δ = 0, with the true effect size δ defined as δ = (µ1 − µ2)/σ
(Rouder et al. 2009).
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Using the statistics software R, we randomly generate data for two independent
groups. We study two conditions, one where the null hypothesis is (clearly) false
and one where it is literally true. As representative of a positive effect, we choose
d = 0.41, in agreement with meta-studies that consider this value typical of effect
sizes in behavioral research (Richard, Bond, and Stokes-Zoota 2003; Fraley and Vazire
2014). The data for the groups is randomly generated. For the first group, the mean
is zero (with standard deviation σ = 1) while for the second, the mean corresponds
to the hypothesized effect size (either d = 0 or d = 0.41). We then compute the
observed effect size and repeat this procedure to simulate multiple replications of a
single experiment. At the same time, we simulate a cumulative meta-analysis of the
effect size estimates. Figure 1 shows the observed effect sizes from 10 replications and
how they are aggregated into an overall meta-analytic estimate.5
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Figure 1: Observed effect sizes with confidence intervals in the replication of an experiment (left
figure) and the corresponding aggregated effect size estimate (right figure). Data generated under the
assumption d = 0.41.
5The details of the aggregation procedure are as follows (again, we follow Romero 2016): We assume
that effect size is fixed across experiments, or in other words, that all single experiments are measuring
the same effect size. Then, the aggregated effect size D after M experiments is given by D = Σ
M
i=1widi
ΣMi=1wi
.
Here di denotes the effect size observed in experiment i, and wi = 1/vi denotes the inverse of the variance
of observed effect size, approximated by vi := 2N +
d2i
2N2 for sample size N. The variance of D, which is
necessary to calculate the associated confidence intervals, is given by vD = 1Σwi (Cumming 2012, 210–213;
Borenstein et al. 2009, 63–67).
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We expect that frequentist and Bayesian inference both validate SCT* under ideal
conditions where various biases and imperfections are absent. The big question is
whether Bayesian statistics improves upon NHST when we move to more realistic sce-
narios. In particular: Are the experiments sufficiently powered to detect an effect?
Are the researchers biased into a particular direction? Are non-significant results sys-
tematically dismissed? The available evidence on published research suggests that the
answers to these questions should not always be yes, leaving open whether SCT* will
still hold in those cases. We model the relevant factors as binary variables, contrasting
an ideal or utopian condition to a less perfect (and more realistic) condition. Let’s look
at them in more detail.
Variable 1: Sufficient vs. Limited Resources
NHST is justified by its favorable long-run properties, spelled out in terms of error
control: a true null hypothesis is rarely “rejected” by NHST and a true alternative
hypothesis typically yields a statistically significant result. To achieve these favorable
properties, experiments require an adequate sample size. Due to lack of resources and
other practical limitations (e.g., availability of participants/patients, costs of trial, time
pressure to finish experiments), sample size is often unsatisfactory small to bound
error rates at low levels. Since the type I error level—that is, the rate of rejecting the
null hypothesis when it is true—is conventionally fixed at 5%, this means that the
power of a test (=1-type II error rate) is frequently low and can even fall below 50%
(e.g., Ioannidis 2005).
In our simulation study, we compare two cases: first, a condition where the type
I error rate is bound at the 5% level and power relative to d = 0.41 equals 95%.
This condition of sufficient resources and sufficient sample size (N=156) is contrasted
to a condition of limited resources that is typical of many experiments in behavioral
research. In that condition, both experimental groups have sample size N=36, resulting
in a power of only 40%.
While the limited resources condition (N=36) is invariant across the competing
statistical frameworks, the Bayesian needs to conceptualize the sufficient resources
condition differently: type I and type II error rates belong conceptually to frequentist
inference. Their analogue is to control the probability of misleading evidence (Royall
2000; Schönbrodt and Wagenmakers 2018). We should design an experiment such that
the Bayes factor will, with high probability, not state evidence for H1 when H0 is true,
or vice versa. Suppose K > 0 represents a conventionally agreed evidence threshold
such that BF10 > K means (substantial) evidence for H1. Transferring the ideas of
controlling type I error and achieving sufficient power to the Bayesian framework,
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Figure 2: Graphical illustration of the distribution of Bayes factors and probability of misleading ev-
idence in the Bayesian Framework for N=36 and hypothesized effects of d = 0 and d = 0.4. Figure
produced with the BFDA app https://shinyapps.org/apps/BFDA/ developed by Felix Schönbrodt.
sample size N should be chosen such that
pH0(BF10(X1, . . . , XN) > K) ≤ 0.05 pH1(BF10(X1, . . . , XN) > K) ≥ 0.95.
In other words, the probability of finding misleading evidence against the null hy-
pothesis should be smaller then 5%, and the probability of finding evidence for the
alternative hypothesis when it is true should be at least 95%. See Figure 2 for a graph-
ical illustration of the distribution of the Bayes factor. The appropriate choice of K
depends on the strength of the evidence that is relevant for the particular application
(e.g., K = 3, 6, 10 . . .). We use K = 3, the conventional borderline between weak and
moderate evidence. This choice will be motivated in more detail below. For our repre-
sentative effect sizes of d = 0 and d = 0.41, the appropriate sample size in the Bayesian
sufficient resources condition is equal to N=190.
Variable 2: Direction Bias
Scientists sometimes conduct their research in a way that is shaped by selective per-
ception and biased expectations. For example, feminist critiques of primatological
research have pointed out that evidence on the mating behavior of monkeys and
apes was often neglected when it contradicted scientists’ theoretical expectations (e.g.,
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polygamous behavior of females: Hrdy 1986; Hubbard 1990). More generally, re-
searchers often exhibit confirmation bias (e.g., MacCoun 1998; Douglas 2009): their per-
ception of empirical findings is shaped by the research program to which they are
committed. There is also specific evidence that results are more likely to be published
if they agree with previously found effects and exhibit positive magnitude (Hopewell
et al. 2009; Lee et al. 2013). Effects that contradict one’s theoretical expectations and
have a negative magnitude may either be suppressed as an act of self-censuring or be
discarded in the peer review process. Such direction bias is obviously detrimental to
the impartiality and objectivity of scientific research, and we expect that it affects the
accuracy of meta-analytic effect estimation and the validity of SCT*, too.
We model direction bias by a variable that can have two values: either all results
are published, regardless of whether the effect is positive or negative (=no direction
bias), or all results with negative effect size magnitude are suppressed (=direction
bias present).
Variable 3: Suppressing Inconclusive Evidence
In an ideal world, results supporting the null hypotheses would be as likely to be
reported as results supporting the alternative. After all, any systematic suppression
of evidence can be expected to lead to a distorted picture of effect size. However,
in practice, non-significant outcomes of NHST are often filtered out and end up in
the proverbial file drawer, diminishing the reliability of published research (Rosenthal
1979; Ioannidis 2005; Fanelli 2010). We distinguish between two conditions: an ideal
condition where all results are published, also non-significant ones (i.e., results with
a p-value exceeding .05), and a non-ideal condition where only results significant at
the 5% level are published, and enter the meta-analytic effect size aggregation.
To date, there has not yet been a systematic study of evidence filtering in Bayesian
statistics. Nonetheless, it is fair to assume that similar psychological mechanisms may
operate. The role of the p-value or significance level is then played by the Bayes factor.
When the Bayes factor is close to 1, the evidence is inconclusive: the null hypothesis
and the alternative are equally likely to explain the observed data. Therefore it is
hard to extract a clear “story” from the study, making the results more difficult to sell
and eventually, to publish. In agreement with this rationale—and in order to draw
a meaningful comparison between NHST and Bayesian statistics—we distinguish two
conditions in Bayesian inference. In the ideal condition, all observed Bayes factors
are reported, regardless of their value, whereas the non-ideal condition excludes all
Bayes factors reporting weak evidence, that is, those values where neither the null
hypothesis nor the alternative are clearly favored by the data.
We consider two Bayesian explications of “weak evidence”: the range 1/6 <
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BF10 < 6 that Schönbrodt and Wagenmakers (2018) use for the Bayes factor design
analysis, and the more narrow range 1/3 < BF10 < 3. The second option strikes us
as more adequate. First, the proposal K = 6 does not correspond to an interpreta-
tion of Bayes factors anchored in existing conventions. Most researchers use a quasi-
logarithmic scale where the interval 1–3 corresponds to anecdotal evidence for H1,
3–10 to moderate evidence, 10–30 to strong evidence, and so on (Jeffreys 1961; Lee and
Wagenmakers 2014). Reversely for the ranges 1/3 to 1, 1/10 to 1/3, and so on. Second,
and more importantly, we need to compare the Bayesian and frequentist meta-analysis
on equal grounds. This means that the intuitive meaning of the p < .05 significance
threshold needs to be mapped to an appropriate Bayesian threshold. Since frequentists
consider p-values between .05 and .10 as weak or anecdotal evidence, barely worth a
mention (as witnessed by formulations such as “marginally significant” and “trend”),
the border between weak and moderate evidence in the Bayesian framework—that is,
K = 3—strikes us as a natural “translation” of the frequentist threshold p = .05. Third,
BF10 ≈ 3 is typically obtained in Bayesian re-analyses of frequentist experiments with
an observed significance level of p ≈ .05 (Benjamin et al. 2018). Hence, our choice of
K = 3 ensures a level playing field between Bayesian and frequentist inference.
4 Results: The Baseline Condition
Our simulations compare the performance of NHST and Bayesian inference in two
types of situations: the baseline conditions and extensions of the model. The baseline
conditions, numbered S1–S16, take the three variables described in Section 3 and the
true effect size as independent variables. Table 1 explains which scenario corresponds
to which combination of values of these variables. The model extensions explore a
wider range of situations: we examine conditions where some, but not all negative
results are published, and we contrast Bayesian and frequentist inference for a wider
range of effect sizes (e.g., small effects such as d ≈ 0.2 or large effects such as d ≈ 1).
We begin with the ideal case where resources are sufficient and all evidence is
d = 0.41 d = 0 d = 0.41 d = 0
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16
Sufficient Resources X X X X X X X X
No direction bias X X X X X X X X
Inconclusive evidence is published X X X X X X X X
Table 1: The 16 possible simulation scenarios.
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published (scenario S1). Figure 3 shows the progression of the meta-analysis over time,
for a total of 25 replications. We observe that both the Bayesian and the frequentist
framework validate SCT*: the aggregated effect size accurately estimates the actual
effect size and convergence is fast, too.
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Figure 3: Meta-analytic results for Bayesian and frequentist inference in Scenario 1 (=the ideal condition
with d = 0.41), as a function of the number of replications. The shaded area represents the data that are
within one standard deviation of the observed mean.
Turning to less ideal and more realistic scenarios, Figure 4 reveals that there is
no notable difference between Bayesian and frequentist inference as long as “negative
results” (i.e, results with inconclusive evidence) are published. When the alternative
hypothesis is true, meta-analytic estimates are accurate in both frameworks (scenarios
S1–S4); when the null hypothesis is true, both frameworks are vulnerable to direction
bias (scenarios S7–S8). This sensitivity to the value of d can be explained easily: when
the alternative hypothesis is true, few experiments will yield estimates with a negative
magnitude. As a consequence, the presence or absence of direction bias does not affect
the meta-analytic aggregation substantively.
All in all, the evaluation of scenarios S1–S8 does not make the case for statistical
reform: whatever the merits of Bayesian inference from a foundational point of view,
in a classical estimation problem like the aggregation of observed effect sizes, it is not
more reliable than frequentist inference with NHST.
Figure 5 shows the results of scenarios S9–S16 where a file drawer effect is op-
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Figure 4: Meta-analytic results for Bayesian inference (red bars) and frequentist inference (blue bars)
in conditions S1–S8 after 25 replications. Upper graph: scenarios S1–S4 where d = 0.41, lower graph:
scenarios S5—S8 where d = 0. All inconclusive evidence is published. The dashed line represents the
true effect size, the error bars show one standard deviation.
erating and inconclusive, “non-significant” evidence is suppressed. To recall, this
means that data from experiments with p ≥ .05 or with a Bayes factor in the range
1/3 < BF10 < 3 do not enter the meta-analysis. In some of these scenarios, espe-
cially when the null hypothesis is true and direction bias is present, the frequentist
largely overestimates the actual effect size (e.g., d ≈ 0.3 in S15 and d ≈ 0.5 in S16
while in reality, d = 0). The reason is that the frequentist conception of “significant
evidence” filters out evidence for the null hypothesis and acts as an amplifier of di-
rection bias: only statistically significant effect sizes with positive magnitude enter the
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Figure 5: Meta-analytic results for Bayesian inference (red bars) and frequentist inference (blue bars)
in conditions S9–S16 after 25 replications. Upper graph: scenarios S9–S12 where d = 0.41, lower graph:
scenarios S13—S16 where d = 0. All inconclusive evidence is suppressed. The dashed line represents the
true effect size, the error bars show one standard deviation.
meta-analysis (e.g., d ≥ 0.47 in S16). By contrast, the Bayesian also reports evidence
that speaks strongly for the null hypothesis (i.e., d ≈ 0) and notes just a very weak
positive effect.
A similar diagnosis applies when the alternative hypothesis is true, regardless of
direction bias. Consider scenarios S10 and S12. Due to the limited resources and the
implied small sample size, only large effects meet the frequentist threshold p < .05,
leading to a substantial overestimation of the actual effect (d ≈ 0.65 in both scenarios,
instead of the true d = 0.41). The overestimation in the Bayesian case, by contrast, is
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negligible for S10 and moderate for S12 (d ≈ 0.5).
Thus, while there is little difference between the reliability of frequentist and
Bayesian inference in the absence of a file drawer effect, Bayesian inference performs
considerably better when inconclusive evidence is not published. Such a publication
bias is, unfortunately, often found in empirical research. Thus, we conclude that the
statistical reformist is partially right: Bayesian design and analysis of experiments
leads to more accurate meta-analytic effect size estimates when the experimental con-
ditions are non-ideal and inconclusive evidence is suppressed.6
The next two sections present two extensions that model other practically relevant
situations.
5 Extension 1: The Probabilistic File Drawer Effect
The preceding simulations have modeled the file drawer effect as the exclusion of
all non-significant p-values. In practice, it will depend a lot on the context whether
inconclusive evidence is published or not. Bakker, van Dijk and Wicherts (2012) report
studies according to which the percentage of unpublished research in psychology may
be greater than 50%. Especially in conceptual replications and other follow-up studies
it is plausible that evidence contradicting the original result may be discarded (e.g., by
finding the fault with oneself and repeating the experiment with a slightly different
design or test population). Then, disciplines with an influential private sector such
as medicine may be especially susceptible to bias in favor of significant evidence: as
indicated by the effect size gap between industry-funded and publicly funded studies,
sponsors are often disinterested in publishing research on an apparently ineffective
drug (Wilholt 2009; Lexchin 2012).
By contrast, there is an increasing number of prestigious journals that accepts sub-
missions according to the “registered reports” model: before starting to collect the
data, the researcher submits a study proposal which is accepted or rejected on the ba-
sis of the study’s theoretical interest and the experimental design.7 This means that the
paper will be published regardless of whether the results are statistically significant or
not. Moreover, in large-scale replication projects such as Open Science Collaboration
6Note that these conclusions are sensitive to choice of the threshold K = 3 in the Bayes factor design
analysis and the exclusion of inconclusive evidence. If the threshold is made more stringent, e.g., K = 6,
there are also some scenarios where the frequentist analysis performs better. However, we have argued
in Section 3 that such a comparison would not be appropriate since the evidence thresholds of both
frameworks should match each other, and K = 6 should be compared to a more severe frequentist
conception of evidence, e.g., p < .01.
7Some of the better known journals who offer this publication model are Nature Human Behaviour,
Cortex, European Journal of Personality and the British Medical Journal Open Science.
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2015 or Camerer et al. 2016 that examine the reproducibility of previous research, the
evidence is published regardless of direction or size of the effect.
Taking all this together, we can expect that some proportion of statistically inconclu-
sive studies will make it into print, or be made publicly available, while a substantial
part of them will remain in the proverbial file drawer. We extend our original model
by investigating how the performance of frequentist and Bayesian inference depends
on the proportion of inconclusive evidence that is actually published.
Figure 6: Overestimation of parameter value as a function of the probability of suppressing inconclusive
evidence. Left graph = frequentist analysis, right graph = Bayesian analysis.
Like in the baseline condition, we model the suppression of inconclusive evidence
as not reporting non-significant results, i.e., p > .05 and Bayes factors with weak,
anecdotal evidence (1/3 < BF10 < 3). Figure 6 plots effect size overestimation in both
frameworks as a function of the probability of publishing studies with inconclusive
evidence.
For the frequentist, estimates get more accurate when more statistically non-
significant studies are published. Notably, when direction bias is present, publishing
just a small proportion of those studies is already an efficient antidote to large over-
estimation. This is actually logical: when direction bias is present and statistically
non-significant results are suppressed, only studies with extreme effects are published
and including some non-significant results will already be a huge step toward more
realistic estimates.
The accuracy of the Bayesian estimates, however, does not depend much on the
probability of publishing inconclusive studies—the overestimation is more or less in-
variant under the strength of the file drawer effect. Indeed, the Bayesian estimates
are already accurate when all inconclusive evidence is suppressed. Using Bayesian
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inference instead of NHST may act as a safeguard against effect size overestimation
in conditions where the extent of publication bias is unclear and potentially large. As
soon as 20-30% of statistically non-significant results are published, however, frequen-
tist estimates become similarly accurate.
6 Extension 2: A Wider Range Of Effect Sizes
While d = 0.41 may be a good long-term average for the effect size of true alternative
hypotheses in behavioral research, effect sizes will typically spread over a wide range,
ranging from small and barely observable effects (d ≈ 0.1) to very large and striking
effects (e.g., d ≈ 1). This depends also on the specific scientific discipline and the
available means for filtering noise and controlling for confounders. To increase the
generality of our findings, we examine a wider range of true effect sizes. We focus on
those conditions where Bayesians and frequentists reach different conclusions—that
is, scenarios S9–S16 where inconclusive evidence is suppressed. Figure 7 and 8 show
for both frameworks how the difference between estimated and true effect size varies
as a function of the true effect size.
Figure 7: Difference between estimated and true effect size as a function of the true effect size (mea-
sured by standardized means difference), for scenarios with direction bias and suppression of inconclu-
sive evidence. Blue line = frequentist analysis, red line = Bayesian analysis.
When direction bias is present (Figure 7), the Bayesian estimate comes closer to the
true effect. Frequentists largely overestimate small effects due to the combination of
direction bias and suppressing inconclusive evidence, but they estimate large effects
accurately. This is to be expected since with increasing effect size, almost everything
will be significant and less and less results will be suppressed. In these cases, the
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file drawer effect does not compromise the accuracy of the meta-analytic estimation
procedure.
Figure 8: Difference between estimated and true effect size as a function of the true effect size (mea-
sured by standardized means difference), for scenarios with suppression of inconclusive evidence and no
direction bias. Blue line = frequentist analysis, red line = Bayesian analysis.
Turning to the case of no direction bias, shown in Figure 8, two observations are
striking. First, the frequentist graph ceases to be monotonically decreasing: small
effects are substantially overestimated while null effects are estimated accurately. This
is because, in the case of N=36, all results inside the range d ∈ [−0.47; 0.47] yield a
p-value higher than .05 and do not enter the meta-analysis. For a true small positive
effect, we will therefore observe many more (large) positive than negative effects and
obtain a heavily biased meta-analytic estimate. For a true null effect, however, positive
and negative magnitude effects are equally likely to be published and the aggregated
estimate will be accurate. Similarly, when effects are big enough, few results will
remain unpublished and the meta-analytic estimate will converge to the true effect
size. The left graph in Figure 9 visualizes these explanations by plotting the probability
density function of d, and the range of censured observations.
Second, the Bayesian slightly underestimates small effects. This phenomenon is
due to a superposition of two effects. Unlike the frequentist, the Bayesian publishes
large effects in both directions and observed effects close to the null value d ≈ 0.
Intermediate effect size estimates from single studies are not published and left out
of the meta-analysis—see Figure 9. For small positive effects such as d = 0.1 or d =
0.2, the Bayesian is more likely to obtain results that favor the null hypothesis with
BF01 > 3, than results that favor the alternative with BF10 > 3. However, the amount
of underestimation does not affect the qualitative interpretation of the effect size in
17
Figure 9: Probability density functions for the expected value of the standardized sample mean in a
single experiment for N = 36 and different values of the real effect size. Full line: d = 0.15, dashed line:
d = 0.41, dotted line: d = 0. The censured regions (i.e., observations that do not enter the meta-analysis
because p > .05 or 1/3 < BF10 < 3) are shaded in grey. Left graph: frequentist case, right graph:
Bayesian case.
question.
All in all, it is notable that “two wrongs seem to make a right”: omitting weak
evidence in favor of the alternative and in favor of the null hypothesis leads to more
accurate meta-analytic estimates than omitting statistically non-significant results only,
as the frequentist does. These observations are especially salient for small effects.
SCT*—the thesis about the self-corrective nature of science in sequential replications
of an experiment—holds for a wider range of possible effect sizes when replacing
NHST with Bayesian inference.
Our findings also agree with the distribution of effect sizes in the OSC replication
project for behavioral research (Open Science Collaboration 2015): replications of ex-
periments with large observed effects usually confirm the original diagnosis, while
moderate effects often turn out to be small or inexistent in the replication.8 While a
more detailed and substantive analysis would require assumptions about the preva-
lence of direction bias and suppressing inconclusive evidence in empirical research,
our findings are, at first sight, consistent with patterns observed in recent replication
research.
8This observation has to be taken with a grain of salt since the OSC replication uses standardized
correlation coefficients instead of standardized mean differences.
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7 Conclusion
Numerous areas of science are struck by a replication crisis—a failure to reproduce
past landmark results. Such failures diminish the reliability of experimental work in
the affected disciplines and the epistemic authority of the scientists that work in them.
There is a plethora of suggestions what science should do in order to leave this state
of crisis behind. Three principled strategies can be distinguished. The first strategy,
called statistical reform, blames statistical procedures, in particular in the continued use
of null hypothesis significance tests (NHST). Were NHST to be abandoned and to be
replaced by Bayesian inference, scientific findings would be more replicable. The op-
posed strategy, called social reform, contends that the current social structure of science,
in particular career incentives which reward novel and spectacular findings, has been
the main culprit in bringing about the replication crisis. Between these extremes is
a wide range of proposals for methodological reform that combines elements of social
interaction and statistical method techniques (multi-site experiments, data-sharing,
compulsory preregistration, etc.).
In this paper, we have explored the scope of statistical reform proposals by con-
trasting Bayesian and frequentist inference with respect to a specific thesis about the
self-corrective nature of science, SCT*: convergence to the true effect in a sequential
replication of experiments. Validating SCT* is arguably a minimal adequacy condition
for any statistical reform proposal that addresses the replication crisis. Our model
focuses on a common experimental design—two independent samples with normally
distributed data—and compares NHST and Bayesian inference in different conditions:
an ideal scenario where resources are sufficient and all results are published, as well
as less ideal (and more realistic) conditions, where experiments are underpowered
and/or various biases affect the publication of a research finding.
Our results support a partially positive verdict on the efficacy of statistical re-
form. When studies with inconclusive evidence—or at least a substantial proportion
of them—are published, both Bayesian inference and frequentist inference with NHST
lead to quite accurate estimates and validate SCT*. However, when inconclusive evi-
dence is not published, as it often happens in scientific practice, Bayesian inference
leads to more accurate effect size estimates. Specifically, the Bayesian framework
avoids the large overestimations that frequently occur in NHST. Thus, SCT* holds
for a wider range of scenarios using Bayesian inference and in these conditions, sta-
tistical reform will indeed improve the reproducibility of published studies and the
reliability of experimental research.
Building on the extensions of our model where different effect size ranges are
studied, we can qualify this conclusion further. The advantage of Bayesian statistics
is particularly salient for small effect sizes, which the frequentist often misidentifies
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as moderate or relatively large effects. This finding is in line with observations from
replication research that small effects are at particular risk of being overestimated
systematically.
Our study has evident limitations, too. First, our results do not prove that mov-
ing to Bayesian statistics is the best way to statistical reform: alternative frameworks
within the frequentist paradigm (e.g., Lakens, Scheel and Isager 2018; Mayo 2018)
could improve matters equally, or even more so. Assessing such proposals is beyond
the scope of this paper. Second, statistical reform does not cure all the problems of
scientific inference. We have not discussed here which concrete steps for social reform
(e.g., changing the credit reward scheme, funding replication work, etc.) would be
most effective in complementing statistical reforms. The interplay of reform proposals
on different levels is a fascinating topic for future research in the social epistemology
of science. At this point, we can just observe that the file drawer effect seems to be
particularly detrimental to reliable effect size aggregation, and that proposals for so-
cial and methodological reform should try to combat it. Compulsory pre-registration
of experiments is a natural approach, but studying the efficacy of that strategy has to
be left to future work.
Increasing the reliability of published research remains a complex and challenging
task, involving reform of the scientific enterprise on various levels. What we have
shown in this paper is that the choice of the statistical framework plays an impor-
tant role in this process. All other things being equal, adopting Bayesian principles
for designing and analyzing experiments leads to more accurate effect size estimates,
without incurring substantial drawbacks. Ultimately, this thesis should also be tested
against a track record of published research: Are effect size estimates from experi-
ments using Bayesian statistics really more robust in replication than their frequentist
counterparts? Or does our model neglect important factors which offset the advan-
tages of Bayesian inference? We are curious whether the recent surge of Bayesian
methods in experimental research (e.g., Rouder et al. 2009; Lee and Wagenmakers
2014) will provide us with data that allow us to answer these questions.
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